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ABSTRACT: Agrarian reform settlements have recently been identified as a major 
contributor to ongoing deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Collective forest 
reserves were established in some settlements to thwart forest loss, but settlers usually 
do not recognize forest commons, opting instead for continued private accumulation 
through forest clearing, or a “non‑commons” tragedy. Pathways toward ensuring the 
viability of common‑pool management in settlements remain unclear. Our case study 
focused on two similarly sized settlements in neighboring municipalities in Northwest 
Mato Grosso, Brazil, each with formally designated collective forest areas. In one, 
deforestation shifted into the collective reserve and intensified; in the other, 
deforestation stabilized and the collective reserve was protected. In the latter, settlers 
understood their collective forest reserve as a commonly held asset, with two 
commercially viable settlement cooperatives involved in Brazil nut (Bertholletia 
excelsa) extractivism and added value processing. We analyze differences between the 
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two settlements using Elinor Ostrom’s framework for analysis of socio‑ecological 
systems, and identify the locally applied policy mix ensuring the viability of a forest 
commons. The study concludes that “top‑down” efforts to institutionalize collective 
governance over remaining forests will likely fail in most settlements, without a focus 
on alternative livelihood opportunities synergetic with forest tenure.
KEYWORDS: Brazilian Amazon; agrarian reform settlements; collective reserves; 
common property resource management; institutions.
JEL CODES: Q15; Q57; P48.
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UM MIX DE POLÍTICAS PARA EVITAR A 
PRIVATIZAÇÃO DOS RECURSOS NATURAIS 
NAS RESERVAS FLORESTAIS COLETIVAS 
DOS ASSENTAMENTOS RURAIS NO 
NOROESTE DE MATO GROSSO
RESUMO: Os assentamentos da reforma agrária foram recentemente identificados 
como um dos principais contribuintes ao contínuo desmatamento na Amazônia bra‑
sileira. Reservas florestais coletivas foram estabelecidas em alguns assentamentos para 
impedir a supressão de florestas, mas os assentados geralmente não reconhecem os 
bosques coletivos, optando pelo contínuo acúmulo privado de bens e capital através 
do desmatamento: uma tragédia dos recursos naturais “não‑comuns” ou não‑coleti‑
vos. Caminhos para garantir a viabilidade da gestão de recursos coletivosnos assenta‑
mentos permanecem obscuros. Nosso estudo de caso focalizou dois assentamentos de 
tamanho semelhante, em municípios vizinhos no Noroeste do Mato Grosso, Brasil, 
ambos contando com áreas de floresta coletiva formalmente designadas. Em um dos 
assentamentos, o desmatamento se deslocou para a reserva coletiva e se intensificou. 
No outro, em contraposição, o desmatamento se estabilizou e a reserva coletiva foi 
protegida. Neste último, os assentados percebiam sua reserva florestal coletiva como 
um ativo comunitário, com duas cooperativas formadas por assentados comercial‑
mente viáveis, envolvidas no extrativismo de castanha‑do‑Brasil (Bertholletia excelsa) 
e no processamento da mesma para alcançar maior valor agregado. Analisamos as di‑
ferenças entre os dois assentamentos, aplicando a estrutura de critérios de Elinor 
 Ostrom para comparar os sistemas sócio‑ecológicos e identificamos o mix de políticas 
públicas aplicadas localmente, que viabilizaram os benefícios gerados pela floresta. O 
estudo conclui que os esforços para institucionalizar a governança coletiva sobre as 
florestas remanescentes iniciados “de cima para baixo” provavelmente irão fracassar 
na maioria dos assentamentos, se não houver um foco em oportunidades alternativas 
de subsistência complementares aos direitos de propriedade sobre as florestas.
PALAVRAS‑CHAVE: Amazônia brasileira; assentamentos da reforma agrária; re‑
servas coletivas; gestão coletiva de recursos naturais; instituições.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Government sponsored colonization of the Brazilian Amazon started in the early 
1970s, leading to the creation of federal agrarian reform settlements (settlements) 
administered by the Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA). Today 
federally administered settlements occupy just over 5% of the Amazon biome in Brazil, 
or about 265,000 km2, an area like that of the entire state of São Paulo (SCHNEIDER 
and PERES, 2015). While the contribution of settlements to deforestation overall has 
been significantly less than that caused by large landholdings (PACHECO, 2009; 
GODAR et al., 2014), since 2005 deforestation in INCRA settlements has not declined 
as steadily compared to deforestation caused by other actors and under other land 
tenure arrangements (INPE, 2015; BRANDÃO et al., 2013). Settlements now represent 
one of the principal sources of continuing deforestation in the region (SCHNEIDER 
and PERES, 2015). The biophysical pattern of deforestation in settlements is well 
documented (ALDRICH et al., 2006), patterns driven in part by governance conditions 
and state policy (ALSTON et al., 1999; FEARNSIDE, 2005; ALMEYDA ZAMBRANO 
et al., 2010).
This does not imply, however, that state policies for land tenure in the Brazilian 
Amazon match with practices on the ground. For example, to counter forest loss in 
past attempts to comply with the Brazilian Forest Code1, INCRA demarcated several 
collective forest reserves in settlements and has designated some as “forest 
settlements”. Under the Forest Code, properties are required to maintain 80% of 
land in the Amazon biome under natural vegetation, known as a “Legal Reserve” 
(LR). In theory, in INCRA settlements collective LRs are designed to establish a 
common forest area equivalent to the amount of land that would formerly have 
been designated on individual lots. Individual lots still are required to preserve 
áreas de proteção permanente, or permanent protected areas along streams and on 
steep slopes, but are partially exempted from LR requirements once a collective 
reserve is demarcated.
Colonist settlers in the Brazilian Amazon however rarely have experience with 
collective land management and may view unoccupied forests in settlements as lands 
open to individual appropriation. The governance issue remains: how to maintain 
collective forest reserves? Regarding collective or common pool natural resource 
management, Elinor Ostrom identified how shared rules, norms, and strategies govern 
1 As revised by Federal Law 12,727, 17 October 2012. Available at:<www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_
Ato2011‑2014/2012/Lei/L12727.htm>.
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the commons (OSTROM, 1990, 2005, 2010). In numerous case studies on functioning 
common‑pool resource management, Ostrom and her followers often modeled the 
viability of collective action in part on the existence of social norms or trust amongst 
resource users, or social capital. These were often local or autochthonous rules systems 
operating with some autonomy from the State (AGRAWAL, 2007). But research has 
also shown how local rules emerge in tandem with state policy. For example, 
 Cronkleton and Larson (2015) showed that settlers in the Peruvian and Ecuadorian 
Amazon were empowered to regulate the allocation and use of land within a settlement 
and build mechanisms to mediate conflicts. These institutions however did not arise 
from the formal definition of property rights alone, but rather from social networks 
that supported the restoration or maintenance of traditional collective use rights and 
management rules. 
Settlement communities in the Brazilian Amazon however tend to lack experience 
with traditional systems of land management, and our question is if and how social 
trust and commons institutions can emerge from scratch. The comparative case study 
analysis that follows seeks to illustrate the development, or lack thereof, of institutions 
supporting collective LR in two proximate settlements in northwest Mato Grosso, a 
region subject to significant deforestation pressure. Our paper is structured as follows. 
In the second section, we provide background information on development and 
occupation in Northwest Mato Grosso (NW MT), describing the two case study 
settlements and their history of occupation and land use change. In the third section, 
we outline the land use change, socioeconomic and institutional characteristics that 
differentiate the two sites, despite their physical proximity and similar logistical 
conditions. In doing so, we employ Ostrom’s framework for analysis of socio‑ecol ogical 
systems (SES) (OSTROM, 2007, 2009), in which social capital is one of over 40 
variables. In the fourth section, we discuss the observed experience with collective LR 
areas, and consider our findings in light of the SES analytical framework. In the final 
section, we advance the case for more widespread implementation of collective reserves 
in settlements as part of a unified policy mix contributing to forest governance in the 
Brazilian Amazon.
2. THE STUDY AREA AND POLICY CONTEXT
NW MT is a humid tropical forest (Submontane Open and Dense Ombrophilous 
Forest, IBGE, 2004) region about the size of Guatemala (107,622 km2). The region 
consists of seven municipalities: Aripuanã, Castanheira, Colniza, Cotriguaçu, Juína, 
Juruena, and Rondolândia. Its population of about 120,000 is now 62% urban. 
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NW MT was colonized in the 1970s by private land corporations which received 
public concessions in return for infrastructure development and technical support, 
enabling them to speculate on land sales to farmers from southern Brazil who hoped 
to exchange small parcels in the South for significantly larger holdings in the Amazon. 
Most colonists turned to extensive cattle ranching and unauthorized logging, while 
others became gold and diamond miners. These enterprises became NW MT’s primary 
land use activities (TITO et al., 2011).
By 2012, although deforestation had proceeded apace, over 80% of NW MT’s 
original 104 thousand km2 of primary forest cover remained. Forest remnants were 
located within 11 indigenous areas (37% of remaining forest cover) and in nine 
Conservation Units (5.5% of remaining forest cover) (Figure 1). The remaining 57.5% 
of forest cover was located on private properties ranging from large ranches to small 
farms, and in agrarian reform settlements (MAY et al., 2012)




















Source: Authors’ elaboration based on geographic data on demarcation of indigenous lands (FUNAI), protected areas under 
the SNUC (MMA) and agrarian reform settlements (INCRA).
Beef cattle ranching is the predominant agricultural enterprise in NW MT. Mato 
Grosso hosts the largest livestock population in Brazil (28.4 million head of cattle); 
only one municipality in NW MT – site of a major slaughterhouse financed by the 
Brazilian National Development Bank – has over 642,500 head (IBGE, 2014). Cattle 
in Brazil are generally managed at low stocking rates (average 1.08 AU/ha in the 
Amazon) with little attempt at pasture renewal or intensification, implying that 
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growth in the herd will mean increasing deforestation. The Development Bank has 
deliberately encouraged this expansion by financing slaughterhouse expansion 
without heed for the proximity of remaining intact forests, while rural credit to 
family farmers fosters herd expansion and fencing with similar results (SMERALDI 
and MAY, 2009). 
Recognizing the threat to remaining forests in NW MT, international donors in 
collaboration with state and federal agencies pledged support to a series of projects 
including the “Pilot Program for the Protection of Brazilian Rainforests” G‑7 Pilot 
Program and a regional Global Environment Facility (GEF) sponsored project 
implemented jointly by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the 
state government (hereafter UNDP/GEF), both of which sought to enhance land use 
management capacity by local governments and producer associations in NW MT. 
The G‑7 Pilot Program and UNDP/GEF projects both constituted multi‑faceted 
attempts to build conditions for sustainable development in NW MT. They were 
comprised of support for decentralization of environmental administration; 
consolidation and increase in the area and number of protected areas; consultation 
with regional stakeholders in support of mandated social, economic and ecological 
zoning plans; and agroenvironmental measures. The latter were focused in large 
measure on settlements in the buffer zones of protected areas and indigenous lands. 
Agroenvironmental measures included in programs addressed to settlements in 
NW MT included: technical assistance for soil and water conservation; restoration 
of degraded land; silviculture and agroforestry systems; technical assistance; 
non‑timber forest products; and low impact forest management. Programs for 
subsidized credit, product certification and incentives for added‑value processing of 
forest products were also included. These projects sought to intervene in the 
institutional context by putting into practice a set of instruments and aligned state 
policies, supporting local efforts at social organization, and providing technical 
assistance on various fronts.
In a related study (DAVENPORT et al., 2017), we assessed how such pilot project 
agroenvironmental measures matched with deforestation dynamics over time across 
three settlements in NW MT. In the current article, we focus specifically on how these 
pilot project measures contributed to the relative sustainability of collective LR areas. 
We sought to understand how cooperative, rules‑based systems for collective or 
common‑pool forest management may emerge, despite contradictory broader political 
economic trends. Key to explaining land use decisions and resultant forest conditions 
we are concerned with “how a particular governance arrangement fits the local ecology, 
how specific rules are developed and adapted over time, and whether users consider 
the system to be legitimate and equitable” (OSTROM, 2010). 
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3. ObjECTIVES AND METHODS
To appraise the influence of policy instruments and technical interventions in the 
institutionalization of collective forest management, our initial sources were primary 
and secondary data associated with monitoring and impact assessment during the G‑7 
Pilot Program and UNDP/GEF projects (GONÇALVES, 2009; TITO et al., 2011). 
These historical data were complemented with further analysis on the correlation of 
land use policies with deforestation rates within 12 settlements throughout NW MT 
(NOGUEIRA, 2014). Forest cover data analysis included baseline and year‑by‑year 
changes in forest stocks within each settlement from 1997 to 2012, mapped using 
annual deforestation data, compared with regional deforestation rates (NOGUEIRA, 
2014)2. We calculated the total area of forest remnants at the outset of the settlement, 
and then evaluated the year by year progression of deforestation in terms of the 
percentage of original forest cover remaining.
In addition to historical land use data, we carried out semi‑structured interviews 
with key informants representing practitioners and stakeholders in the field. We aimed 
to: i) comprehend the process of creation and implementation of the collective LR at Vale 
do Amanhecer Settlement Project (PAVAM) and Juruena Settlement Project (PAJUR); 
and ii) identify socio‑economic and institutional factors that positively or negatively 
affected the implementation and maintenance of the collective LR areas within these 
settlements, informed by the SES analytical framework (OSTROM,  2007, 2009).
4. RESULTS
We here describe deforestation dynamics for the selected agrarian reform settlements 
(see Figure 2), both under the administration of Brazil’s Federal Institute for 
Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA):
1. PAJUR – municipality of Cotriguaçu: 30,792 ha, 467 households, inaugurated 
in 1997, settled formally in 2002, but with occupants moving into the 
settlement prior to inauguration.
2. PAVAM – municipality of Juruena: 14,400 ha, 243 households, inaugurated in 
1998, settled in 1998.
2 Derived from imagery analyzed annually for Prodes (Legal Amazon Deforestation Monitoring 
System) based on Landsat imagery and developed by the Brazilian Institute of Space Research – INPE, 
complemented by a state level Deforestation Monitoring System based on Landsat imagery developed by 
the State Environmental Agency – SEMA/MT.
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Figure 2 – Accumulated deforestation (1997‑2014) and 























Note: in PAJUR, the collective LR is separated amongst three non‑contiguous areas, one located in the central area and two 
on the western and eastern fringes of the settlement, while in PAVAM the LR is a contiguous forest area encompassing the 
settlement along the southern and eastern border.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from Prodes/INPe.
Table 1 indicates percentage of original forest cover in the two settlements starting 
from the year of their initiation. In 2014, PAVAM had 54% of original forest area 
remaining, 16 years after settlers began to occupy their lots in 1998. In contrast, PAJUR 
had only 37% of original forested area in 2014, although its effective occupation had 
begun four years later than PAVAM. In the accompanying graph (Figure 2), both 
PAVAM and PAJUR exhibit deforestation rates greater than that of the NW region as 
a whole, but the trend in PAVAM is a decline in annual deforestation toward the 
regional mean, PAJUR continues to deforest relatively rapidly, at a velocity greater 
than that of the region as a whole (see Figure 3).
Table 1 – Accumulated deforestation (1997‑2014) and 
remaining forest cover (2014) at PAVAM and PAjUR







PAVAM 14,400 13,108 6,672 7,727 54
PAJUR 30,792 27,466 19,293 11,499 37
Source: Prodes/Inpe. Own Analysis.
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Figure 3 – Rate of deforestation (% of original forest cover 
degraded per year) in NW MT, PAVAM and PAjUR: 2001‑2012
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from Prodes/INPe.
Our socio‑economic analysis relied on data provided in Davenport et al. (2017) 
with respect to PAVAM and regional agro pastoral production trends, and research 
reported by Eiró and Tricaud (2010) focused on conditions in PAJUR. The former was 
concerned with characterizing production systems, labor requirements and net returns 
associated with adoption of agroforestry and forest product extractivism, while the 
latter was concerned with income and land use and the difficulty of administering 
forest legal reserves, both for individual lots and in collective areas.
Davenport et al. (2017) analyzed economic performance by identifying the 
prevalent operations for cattle and mixed cattle (beef and dairy) systems, comparing 
these production systems with alternatives including agroforestry and non‑timber 
forest product extraction and processing, the latter focused on Brazil nuts (Bertholletia 
excelsa). The regional revenue standard for well managed dairy & beef enterprises by 
smallholders, with an average 39 ha of pasture, yielded gross US$ 212/ha.yr‑1, with 45% 
costs yielding annual net revenues of US $4,547/yr‑1. 
We also considered the historical development of socio‑economic conditions 
within the two settlements in our case study. In PAVAM in 2005, for 70% of its 
households over half of their incomes came from working outside of the settlement, 
often in timber extraction or processing, or in urban areas. Only 12% had farm‑based 
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incomes equal to the Brazilian minimum wage (US$ 150 in 20053). The majority was 
below the poverty line (VARGAS, 2006). Settlers in PAJUR, similarly, in 2009 derived 
an average of 66% of their incomes from off‑farm activities in the timber industry or 
in urban areas. Notwithstanding the lack of a viable income from livestock, 69% of 
settlers in PAJUR also opted to use the land for pasturing cattle as a form of financial 
insurance (EIRÓ and TRICAUD, 2010).
By 2012, however, socio‑economic conditions had changed, at least in PAVAM. In 
2013, two cooperatives: Associação de Mulheres Cantinho da Amazônia (AMCA), 
formed by a group of 120 women, and Cooperativa dos Agricultores do Vale do 
Amanhecer (COOPAVAM), were operating within PAVAM, with support from a 
sequence of pilot projects underway in NW MT as previously described. These 
cooperatives were processing Brazil nuts procured from the settlement’s collective LR. 
The monetary value derived from this activity for Brazil nut flour and oil was US$ 71 
ha‑1yr‑1 with 10% costs, yielding an estimated US$ 461,880 in annual net revenue, if 
based only on the Brazil nuts procured solely from PAVAM’s 7,200‑hectare collective 
LR. With approximately 70 direct participants in the cooperatives, and assuming 10% 
costs, this would yield US$ 6,573 user‑1yr‑1 net revenue: a 45% gain in annual net 
revenue over the regional standard for well‑managed mixed beef and dairy cattle 
operations. As such, livelihoods among PAVAM settlers shifted from one based 
primarily on cattle to one which derived a significant share of income from Brazil nut 
trees as commonly held assets within the settlement itself. In addition, cooperatives 
within PAVAM also had begun in 2012 to source additional raw Brazil nuts from 
surrounding areas: from four indigenous territories, one Extractive Reserve and 
miscellaneous smallholders, yielding significant additional revenues. In this value 
chain, indigenous communities, reserve inhabitants and small holders delivered raw 
nuts to the settlement under favorable price contracts: in 2013 the cooperative’s price 
for raw Brazil nuts had risen to BRL 3.00kg‑1, compared to BRL 0.60kg‑1 in 2002.
An institutional analysis carried out in PAVAM in 2012 and 2013 applied 
questionnaires and semi‑structured interviews with individual farmers, designed to 
record the experience of farmers’ interaction with various government agencies and 
project entities. Cross‑referencing the latter, researchers also conducted a group 
workshop with PAVAM farmers, to appraise the historical development of land use 
decision‑making processes and institutional arrangements. Settlers worked to identify 
community events, deforestation trajectories and factors involved in land use decisions 
in each year from 1998 – year of the founding of the settlement – up to 2012. In PAJUR, 
3 <http://www.debit.com.br/consulta30.php?indice=salario_minimo>.
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field research undertaken in 2009 by collaborating researchers had engaged settlers in 
discussion of their common experience through rapid rural appraisal (EIRÓ and 
TRICAUD, 2010).
Based on combined remote sensing, socio‑economic and institutional analysis, the 
SES characteristics of PAJUR’s collective forest areas were compared with PAVAM’s 
collective forest area, applying variables from the SES analytical framework developed 
by Ostrom (2007, 2009). We identified a set of 21 “second tier” SES variables that best 
encapsulated institutional differences between the two settlements’ collective forest 
reserves. Appendix 1 details our comparative analysis of the differences found between 
PAVAM and PAJUR along these 21 SES variables, that are further described and 
justified below.
Many SES variables encapsulated clear discrepancies between PAVAM’s and 
PAJUR’s respective SES indicators. The most striking difference is that in PAJUR the 
collective LR areas do not function as a common pool resource at all, but as terra 
nullius (non‑property) or indeed as a “non‑commons” (MAY, 1985) subject to 
appropriation and conversion to res privae (private property), in accordance with 
Roman legal terms still used in property theory. Deforestation to secure private land 
tenure in a context laden with risks is the classic dynamic of the Brazilian Amazon 
(ARAUJO, 2009) and construction of roads prior to the installation of PAJUR’s basic 
infrastructure stimulated unauthorized settlement. As such, the history of use of the 
resource (U3 in the Appendix) was also key to the evolution of the SES. According to 
one of our respondents, four families were already living within the collective areas 
when these areas were demarcated under INCRA jurisdiction as part of the settlement 
plan. Nothing was done to remove these initial settlers, and these and subsequent 
occupations inside the collective areas were undertaken by surrounding loggers, 
ranchers and smallholders who knew that INCRA would eventually distribute the 
land to designated settlers, but who also knew that land use restrictions were not 
enforced by INCRA or other state agencies.
By 2012, approximately 200 families occupied ~4,000 hectares in PAJUR’s collective 
LR areas. In terms of ecological outcomes (in line with the rate of deforestation 
described for each settlement in Figure 3) we observed that deforestation took a 
significant uptick in 2012, from 2% to 5%, whereas continued land tenure insecurity 
has fostered continued deforestation by occupants with the expectation that formal 
private property rights will eventually be conceded. Some of the occupants live within 
the occupied areas, while others do not and only maintain farms, mostly involving 
beef and dairy cattle ranching, as well as some cocoa and coffee plantations. Those 
settlers that only farm in the collective LR areas tend to reside in formally demarcated 
lots outside the collective LR areas, or in nearby towns. Interview respondents offered 
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several factors associated with occupation of the collective LR areas and the failure to 
establish common pool arrangements: i) a lack of discussion with settlers to explain 
the collective LR areas and to raise awareness about social responsibility for their 
protection and sustainable use; ii) little cultural appreciation for commonly held assets 
and iii) lack of enforcement by INCRA, even after certain settlers’ complaints about 
the invasion of the collective LR areas. 
PAJUR saw minimal investments into the institutional and economic development 
of collective forest areas. Settlers in PAJUR had received support to gather Brazil nuts 
on a neighboring property managed by the international branch of the French Forest 
Service (ONF). These interventions encouraging Brazil nut harvesting outside of the 
settlement were taken up by a group of approximately 30 settler families from PAJUR. 
However, settlers declined ONF’s proposal that they form cooperatives inside PAJUR. 
This refusal came in part, because ONF was not in the position to negotiate the 
conditions necessary to achieve social trust in collective property with government 
agencies, to enforce land use rules, or assume the costs of obtaining authorization for 
sustainable production within the collective LR areas. 
Our interview respondents offered that settlers in PAJUR failed to realize 
common‑pool resource management because they had not been made conscious of 
social responsibility to protect collective forests. On the contrary, however, based on 
our observations the local population understood collective management as incoherent 
with the reality of accumulation strategies in an informal property‑rights system. 
Thus, the formal mandate to conserve collective LR areas inside PAJUR has had little 
relevance in the context of property‑rights rules based on the de facto private 
appropriation of land. The operational rules in PAJUR’s collective LR areas have 
included black market land sales and land re‑concentration, volatile prices, producers 
assuming most economic risk, and undocumented production. Aiming to represent 
their own interests, settlers active inside the collective LR areas established an 
association that was especially active after the collective LR was formally demarcated 
in 2003. The collective LR areas initially enjoyed little support from local public 
agencies in attending to basic needs, including upkeep of a precarious road 
infrastructure. Currently, however, the municipal government actively communicates 
with and supports the occupants of the collective LR areas by working to address road 
maintenance and the issuance of taxation invoices for farm products, even with the 
illegitimate character of individual land occupation in these areas.
Concerning public policy, INCRA has started to register its territories, including 
PAJUR, within the nationally mandated environmental regulatory system known as the 
Cadastro Ambiental Rural (CAR) or rural land use registry. As of 2015, INCRA plans to 
apply the CAR for entire settlements in Mato Grosso, collectively, rather than for individual 
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demarcated lots. While the CAR registers the location of land and water features, however, 
it is distinct from the administration of land tenure rights. As the collective CAR will 
document the environmental geographical conditions of the settlement as a whole, it 
will not document individual land tenure. As such, a settlement‑wide CAR in PAJUR 
will likely not be able to attribute responsibility for deforestation to specific occupants 
within the collective LR areas. Our respondents reported that INCRA’s current view 
regarding the collective LR areas in PAJUR is that they should no longer be administered 
as collective LR areas at all, whereas the environmental deficit incurred by the 
conversion of these areas into individual lots should be compensated by offsetting 
deforestation with other forested areas elsewhere in the biome.
The other settlements analyzed in this paper, PAVAM, demonstrated development 
of an alternative SES organized around common property arrangements. In this case, 
INCRA was deeply involved in the design and planning of the settlement, with support 
from a decade‑long series of pilot projects. INCRA sought there to create a settlement 
that could serve as a model in terms of forest management and conservation in the 
Amazon region. Lots were demarcated before legal beneficiaries arrived, and roads 
were built parallel to small streams, to avoid degradation of permanent protected areas 
in accordance with environmental regulations. Settlers’ perspectives in PAVAM were 
synergetic with formal government rules, reflected in social esteem for this settlement’s 
collective LR of 7,200 hectares, mapped and authorized for extractive forest production 
through a collectively held state environmental license or Licença Ambiental Única 
(LAU), signed by the State Environmental Secretariat (SEMA‑MT) in May of 2012. 
The LAU held by PAVAM is a comprehensive environmental license encompassing 
long‑term environmental planning for the settlement as a whole, while it legally 
certifies settlement cooperatives to engage in sustainable production of Brazil nut oil, 
food products and other processing and marketing activities. The LAU is designed as 
a land use implementation instrument that – although it was operational in Mato 
Grosso since the late 1990s primarily with large properties – most logically would act 
as a successor to the CAR in that it goes beyond registering land use to actually 
legalizing and certifying sustainable forest management. To our knowledge no other 
settlements has attained a settlement‑wide LAU in Mato Grosso. Throughout the state, 
few private land managers have been able to obtain the LAU for sustainable forest 
management, due to transaction costs and administrative bottlenecks. For PAVAM, 
securing the LAU entailed a six‑year process, involving significant investments and 
commitments by institutional actors (UNDP/GEF, SEMA‑MT and INCRA). Under 
the LAU, the forest area is managed as a single continuous area with a geo‑referenced 
population of 800 Brazil nut trees. Certification for non‑timber forest production was 
tied to the mapping and ecological maintenance of the collective reserve, along with 
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monitoring against invasions through community‑based arrangements. Interestingly, 
the license is effective regardless of formal land tenure conditions on individual 
demarcated lots in the settlement. The collective rights and responsibilities regarding 
the forest reserve are fully documented by the state and are viewed as legitimate by the 
settlers themselves.
Our results indicated that the outcomes of this system included the reduction of 
deforestation rates to a minimum by 2012 (see Figure 3) and the sustainability of the 
common property arrangements. Such stark differences can also be attributed to the 
operational rules involved in production and market contracts. In contrast to PAJUR, 
economic value accruing to the collective LR was due to human‑constructed facilities for 
added value processing and the development of market contracts. The operational rules 
reflected the distribution of economic risk between producer, intermediary and 
consumer. To finance the procurement of raw Brazil nuts by the two settlement 
cooperatives, the National School Meals Program and the Anticipated Acquisition 
Program – both managed by the Federal Supply Company (CONAB) within the Ministry 
of Agriculture – provided US$ 580,000 in advance credit for 2013. These contracts with 
CONAB have allowed the cooperatives to process Brazil nut derived foods, including 
pasta and cookies, to reach 40,000 persons in seven local municipalities in NW MT, as 
well as selling oil and other products for cosmetics manufacturers and consumers. In 
addition, these cooperatives were granted significant tax relief on reported production. 
Further regarding local perception of the functionality of the SES, settlers in 
PAVAM identified the practical influence of specific pilot project interventions. 
Settlers valued highest courses and training, provision of credit, technical assistance, 
social organization, the elaboration of a settlement‑level environmental license, the 
installation and outfitting of the Brazil nut factory, and market channels. These 
interventions supported and complemented the maintenance and protection of the 
collective reserve. Although cooperative processing and marketing of Brazil nut 
products in PAVAM involves only approximately 70 households, just under a third of 
the total in the settlement, we observed a broader social legitimacy for common pool 
arrangements, reflected in a dramatic shift in local production practices by settlers 
there, to the extent that by 2012 no farmers were observed setting fires to manage 
pasture or to clear additional forest.
In contrast, inside PAJUR’s collective LR our respondents reported that settlers 
have had a greater incentive to deforest to secure land tenure, than those located on 
demarcated lots. The principal areas subject to recent burning and deforestation are in 
fact located within the collective LR areas. Property‑rights within the collective LR 
areas are unauthorized, with informal boundaries between private users, enforced by 
local fiat, whereas operational rules include black market land sales and land 
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accumulation, volatile prices, producer risk, and undocumented product sales. 
Furthermore, according to our respondents, no legal procedures exist to evict 
undocumented occupants of the collective LR areas. Paradoxically, the formal rules 
that designated collective areas for forest conservation have served to produce an 
opposite situation from what was intended.
5. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the observed experience with collective LR areas, and 
consider our findings in light of the SES analytical framework. Key to our discussion 
is our focus on the social structure and function of the formally designated collective 
forest areas in the two settlements. This is distinct from focusing on land use under 
formal individual tenure, which is subject to different rules. Remarkably, individual 
land tenure security on demarcated lots is actually slightly higher in PAJUR compared 
to PAVAM: respectively 88% vs. 68% of the occupants are INCRA recognized 
beneficiaries. However, officially demarcated individual tenure, we suggest, has not 
been a determining variable in the rather stark difference between SES governing the 
respective collective forest reserve areas.
We suggest that the sustainability of a common property system in PAVAM, and 
failure in PAJUR, has been the degree of alignment, over time, between collective 
action and formal governance design. We observed that the pilot projects operative in 
PAVAM were able, over at least six years (roughly 2006‑2012), to foment collective 
action alternative to the typical pattern of illegal timber extraction, squatting and 
extensive cattle ranching. This took the form of aligning state policy instruments with 
local interventions. These interventions and policy instruments were applied in the 
following overlapping sequence: 1) setting priorities by mapping the potential of the 
remaining forest; 2) technical assistance and training in community forest management; 
3) cooperative social organization; 4) formalizing the LAU environmental license and 
certification for sustainable production; 5) material investments in buildings and 
equipment; 6) market development, credit financing and the elaboration of contracts 
with surrounding indigenous communities; 7) contracts with private companies and 
with CONAB; 8) national and international recognition of effectiveness through 
public communications; 9) support to expand Brazil nut production (DAVENPORT et 
al., 2017). The temporal sequencing of interventions and instruments in PAVAM seem 
to have overcome political insecurity and public agency dysfunction, including limited 
public resources at SEMA‑MT for the processing of en viron mental licenses for 
sustainable production.
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In PAVAM the collective reserve took on social legitimacy over time, and thereby 
became a recognized mode for collective action, through the application of state 
policies. This shift is even more remarkable given the fact that most settlers, coming 
from southern states of Brazil, had no cultural experience with collective property and 
little incentive to develop cooperatives. In contrast, in PAJUR a failure to establish 
common‑pool management we suggest is not due to the lack of social capital, but due 
to the absence of synergies between government rules and the reality of a local 
socio‑ecol ogical system. In much of the Brazilian Amazon, there is little legitimacy 
amongst colonist settlers for the state’s environmental policies, including those aspects 
of the Brazilian Forest Code that stipulate the maintenance of 80% of land under 
private management in forest legal reserves. Data from several studies in NW MT 
(EIRÓ and TRICAUD, 2010; DAVENPORT, 2013; RODRIGUES, 2015) attest to the 
“inevitability” of land use transformation to cattle ranching in this region as well as the 
social illegitimacy of command and control rules restricting forest conversion to 
pasture. The mismatch between state command and control and the outlooks of the 
local population, also involves NGO and pilot project intermediaries and other locally 
based organizations who are challenged in bridging the divide between de facto land 
use patterns and de jure systems for land tenure and environmental regulation.
While our case study of PAVAM shows that collective LR management can 
represent a means to avert continuing deforestation, systemic socio‑ecological factors 
impede spontaneous adoption of common‑pool management by settlers in the 
Brazilian Amazon. Besides insecure collective forest tenure, such socio‑ecological 
conditions include the lack of bureaucratic capacity, technical assistance, cooperative 
infrastructure, and appropriate financing. To enable investment in collective enterprise, 
settlers must be able to defer returns on capital, often for several years, to permit added 
value industries to achieve sustainability. Although forest products may be gathered 
from mature Brazil nut trees already present in the landscape (more readily than from 
agroforestry), the structuring of processing industries and marketing strategies imply 
considerable delay to achieve financial viability. Our findings concur with other 
research suggesting that a focus on technology adoption alone is not as effective as 
approaches that concentrate on institutional arrangements (RICHARDS, 1997). The 
local absence of State actors and lack of bureaucratic coordination represent serious 
impediments to institutional development and effective governance in settlements4.
4 For instance, the superintendent’s office for INCRA for NW MT is located in Cuiabá, over 900 km distant 
from the settlements under consideration, whereas in 2012 there was only a single INCRA administrator 
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While ecological conditions in both settlements under consideration are favorable 
for the presence and distribution of Bertholletia excelsa (MORI and PRANCE, 1990) 
the potential for management and economic utilization of Brazil nuts and other forest 
products within settlements is closely tied with the development of cooperative 
institutions to govern these resources and to exclude competing use. For settlements, 
it seems clear that neither the presence of a valuable forest resource nor the formal 
establishment of collective tenure were sufficient by themselves to ensure the social 
recognition of a forest commons. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
One of Ostrom’s principal conditions for effective common‑pool management is 
whether resource users can effectively exclude outsiders. Yet, unauthorized land 
occupation within and surrounding settlements is a longstanding practice 
(SCHNEIDER and PERES, 2015). Such occupation often begins as long as ~4 years 
prior to the official decree of settlement status (ibidem). By the time that formal 
settlement is underway, significant forest areas may have already been degraded. 
Settlement patterns thereby subvert state rules, legitimating individual systems of 
resource appropriation rather than protecting the commons. Encroachment on 
collective forest reserves in settlements continues, we suggest, because human actors 
do not foresee direct benefit from these forests as common‑pool resources.
However, it is impractical to posit social capital5 as a central prerequisite condition 
to common‑pool management in settlements, when social norms in the region are 
aligned with the dynamic of individual property accumulation. In PAVAM, systematic 
accomplishments occurred in spite of prevailing cultural norms and outlooks about 
economic development and the state. Social capital or trust should not be viewed as a 
prerequisite ‘stock’ to common‑pool approaches, but rather as emerging out of human 
experiences on the land and in communication with State actors and intervening 
tasked with land tenure regularization for the entire NW MT region, which contains 14 settlements and 
over 10,000 settler families.
5 The concept of social capital has been critiqued for its lack of clarity (PORTES, 2000; PORTES and 
LANDOLT, 2000), and as a tautology in which social capital is assumed to be synonymous with collective 
action and good governance (BALLETT et al., 2007). Ishihara and Pascual (2009) took up criticism 
of the lack of clarity of the connections between social capital, collective action, and natural resource 
governance, by proposing the concept of “common knowledge” the set of understandings embedded in a 
given social structure, which enables putting resources to particular use.
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organizations. Having migrated to the Amazon from distinct regions within Brazil, 
some even from urban areas, very few are cognizant of the ecological characteristics of 
Amazonian soils or forests upon arrival. Settler communities within settlements are 
often fractured, responding to an individualist culture. Since they hail from distinct 
regions, settler colonists to the Brazilian Amazon usually lack previous experience 
with collective resource management (WOLFORD, 2010). Without a common 
experience, they have not had the opportunity to evolve social trust in support of 
collective action posited as necessary by Ostrom (2005).
As such, the principle finding of our case study is that effective conservation of 
forest cover in PAVAM has occurred through concerted attention to socio‑ecological 
systems, over time permitting the formation of alternative livelihoods as a foundation 
for common‑pool management. While PAVAM’s collective forest reserve appeared on 
INCRA’s maps, it only became a recognized mode for collective action, we argue, 
because local, NGO and state officials and technicians attended to the multiple 
ecologic al, technological and administrative aspects of managing a forest for added 
value goods, thereby engendering settlers’ collective institutional commitment. In 
PAJUR, on the other hand, haphazard designation of collective LR, individual 
appropriation of common lands and splintered local organization unfavorable to 
cooperative enterprise denied the perspective for such synergies to emerge. 
The viability and impact of policy instruments is a function of how well they 
interact with the socio‑ecological systemic context (BARTON et al., 2014). But given 
“baseline” SES conditions in settlements in the Brazilian Amazon, the institutionalization 
of forest commons in settlements will require long‑term adaptive management 
involving rights and responsibilities shared between local, NGO, and state actors. 
Given the prevailing set of practices and perceived technical options in settlements in 
the Brazilian Amazon – illegal logging and extensive pasture establishment through 
clear cutting and burning – settlers see themselves on a trajectory toward capital 
accumulation via forest conversion, with limited responsibility for broader social and 
environmental benefits. However, local institutional and technical innovations, 
supported by broader policy networks may have the potential to foment collective 
action for forest conservation. Careful settlement design and planning, emphasizing 
integrated approaches to ensure the social viability of forest commons, represents an 
unusual opportunity to address such systemic socio‑ecological challenges and so 
combat a non‑commons tragedy.
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Appendix 1. Differences between 
PAVAM and PAjUR along the 21 SES 
variables defined by Ostrom (2005)
SES second tier variables 
(Ostrom, 2007; 2009) PAVAM PAJUR
Resource Systems (RS)
RS3 Size of resource system 7,200 hectares of forest reserve (most of 
which had been harvested selectively for 
'noble' hardwoods prior to settlement, but 
fundamentally intact and contiguous)
4,000 hectares of pasture and ~11,000 
hectares of remaining forest within 
collective reserve boundaries: (assuming 
15,000 hectares total for collective LR i.e. 
roughly half the size of the settlement)
RS4 Human‑constructed 
facilities
Brazil nut processing plant consisting of 
several buildings and facilities involving 
several distinct operations (oil, flour, food 
processing); Roads in relatively good 
condition; avoiding permanent protected 
areas outside of the collective reserve
Roads in precarious condition, in some 
cases crossing permanent protected areas 
in lots outside of the collective reserve
RS9 Location One continuous area along southern and 
eastern sides of settlement
Reserve separated in 3 distinct areas; 
complex geography 
Resource units (RU)
RU4 Economic value Brazil nuts processed for flour and oil: US 
$71/ha * 103 hectares per user (7,200 
ha/70 user families) = estimated US$ 6,573 
per year per user (assuming 10% costs); 
US$580,000 in advance credit provided by 
the Federal Supply Company (CONAB) in 
2013
Mixed beef and dairy: US $212/ha * 20 
hectares per user = US $2,332 per year per 




settlements created with strong presence 
by INCRA; aim to be a model in terms of 
forest management and conservation in 
the Amazon region; SEMA‑MT and 
IBAMA (gold mining fiasco in 2004 and 
its repetition in 2012) also involved; 
difficult relationships with local 
government
settlements created with low presence of 
INCRA, minimal presence of SEMA‑MT 




Support from an NGO and GEF project 
on INCRA’s design and planning of the 
settlements; series of overlapping 
integrated projects provide long term 
support for activities inside the settlement: 
Instituto Pró‑Natura (1992‑2005); GEF/
UNDP (2001‑2010); Poço de Carbono 
Juruena (2010‑2014); Sentinels of the 
Forest (2014 to present)
Short term support from the French Office 
Nationale de Forêts (ONF) for local 
conservation projects at the ONF Fazenda 
São Nicolão, located north of the 
settlement along the Juruena river:
GS4 Property‑rights systems Brazil nut trees and collective forest are 
common property in usufruct under 
authority of INCRA
Unauthorized land tenure with informal 
boundaries between users, enforced by 
local fiat; Individually owned cattle 
demarcated by branding
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SES second tier variables 
(Ostrom, 2007; 2009) PAVAM PAJUR
GS5 Operational rules 800 Brazil nut trees are geo‑referenced; 
Prices for Brazil nut products secured 
through contracts; Risk distributed across 
value chain; Tax relief on cooperatives’ 
reported production
Black market land sales and land 
accumulation; Volatile prices; Producer 
risk; Taxable invoices for cattle sales 
difficult to obtain
GS6 Collective‑choice rules 1 association representing common 
interests within the settlement
6 associations representing fragmented 
interests within the settlement
GS7 Constitutional rules Collective Environmental License tied to 
the collective LR, which provides 
environmental legality to the entire 
settlement, regardless of the land tenure 
status of individual beneficiaries outside of 
the reserve or their participation in Brazil 
nut processing
From the administrative standpoint of a 
settlement‑wide environmental registry 
(CAR), 150‑200 families within the 
collective reserve may be ‘invisible’, as 
these users are not tied to demarcated lots; 
CAR rules are not matched with the 
existing resource system based on the 
historical occupation of the collective 
reserve
GS8 Monitoring and 
sanctioning processes
State agencies provide some limited 
support in monitoring of reserve; 
Certification of non‑timber forest 
products based on Brazil Nuts harvested 
on the collective LR, based on sustainable 
management certification criteria; Outside 
of the collective reserve, 170 of 250 (68%) 
of demarcated lots have INCRA 
recognized beneficiaries (as of 2012)
A settlement wide CAR will likely be 
unable to attribute deforestation to 
particular users inside the illegally 
occupied collective LR areas; No legal 
government mechanism exists to expel 
unauthorized users from collective 
reserve; No products involving the 
collective reserve are certified; Outside of 
the collective reserve, 461 of 524 (88%) 
demarcated lots have INCRA recognized 
beneficiaries 
Users (U)
U1 Number of users Roughly 70 families participate in Brazil 
nut cooperatives
~200 families occupying collective forest 
reserve, each occupying 20 hectares 
mostly in pasture
U3 History of use Settlers arrived in ~1999/2000, after lots 
and collective reserve demarcated by 
INCRA
Settlers arrive in 1997/8 before INCRA 




PPG‑7, GEF projects link settlement with 
development of cooperative enterprise 
based on extractivism and added‑value 
processing
Initial efforts to create a cooperative 
disintegrated and led to more informal 
association for Brazil nut harvesting on 
properties external to the settlement
U6 Norms/Social capital Social recognition and legitimacy of 
reserve, linked to state policies; Norms 
function independent of municipal 
politics and alliances (municipal 
authorities in cahoots with gold miners in 
2004‑5); Boundaries of the forest reserve 
are known; Settlers have informal system 
for monitoring the LR
Social norm is the occupation of the 
collective reserve through productive use 
to secure tenure, which is linked to 
municipal politics; No social recognition 
or legitimacy of collective reserve 
U7 Mental models Recognition of the collective LR as a viable 
commonly‑managed asset
No appreciation of the collective LR areas 
as a commons
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SES second tier variables 
(Ostrom, 2007; 2009) PAVAM PAJUR
Interactions (I)
I5 Investment activities US $300,000 supplied by international and 
state agencies (GEF/UNDP, SEMA, 
INCRA) for Brazil nut processing 
infrastructure, and additional CONAB 
working capital finance ($580,000)
Local municipal government provides 
resources for road maintenance, including 
unpaved roads within collective LR
I8 Networking Settler association and cooperatives are 
linked with Mato Grosso state and Federal 
agencies via pilot projects 
Networking with municipal governments 
for road maintenance and in obtaining 
taxable sales invoices for cattle and other 
product sales (even though land tenure is 
unrecognized)




O1 Social performance 
measures
Sustainable commons; Social and material 
infrastructure favoring sustained, long 
term economic returns; System functions 
regardless of land tenure on individual lots 
outside of the collective reserve
Social concentration on economic returns 
to minimal investment; Unsustainable, 
lack of property rights encourages ongoing 
‘frontier’ dynamic; Private land 
accumulation and increasing socio‑
economic inequality are occurring, 
regardless of the informal character of 
land rights
O2 Ecological performance 
measures
Deforestation rates reduced to a minimum 
by 2010; 57% forest cover retained for the 
settlement as a whole (as of 2012)
Significant uptick in deforestation rate 
from 2% to 5% in 2012; 37% forest cover 
retained for the settlement as a whole (as 
of 2012)
